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NOTES
WHAT'S REASONABLE ABOUT AN INVENTORY SEARCH?
An "inventory search," the latest, I and accordingly, least
established exception to the warrant requirement, allows police
who do not have a warrant or probable cause to search and list
the contents of any vehicle taken into police custody. The
search is allegedly legitimated by the need to discover and
protect the contents of lawfully impounded vehicles.2 Since
such a search does not fall within traditional exceptions to the
warrant requirement, e.g., as the search incident to a lawful
arrest 3 or plain view,' it can be upheld only if it meets the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. The
standards of reasonableness applied in different jurisdictions
have not been uniform. Of particular interest is the marked
difference between the standard of reasonableness applied to
inventory searches by the Louisiana courts and that employed
by the federal courts.
1. The constitutionality of inventory searches is a relatively recent problem that
has been judicially considered only during the last two decades.
2. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d
513 (La. 1978). For a more detailed discussion of the suggested justifications and the
criticism they have received, see note 18, infra, and accompanying text. See also
Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Automobile: A Willing Suspension of Debelief, 5
U. BALT. L. REV. 203 (1976); Liski, Inventory Searches of Motor Vehicles: The Effect
of South Dakota v. Opperman, 6 CAPITAL U. L. Rxv. 315 (1976). The latter article
submits that Opperman did not create a new exception to the warrant requirement
by authorizing inventory searches but rather allowed them by extending traditional
exceptions.
3. After a full custodial arrest, police can reasonably search the suspect without
probable cause or a warrant. It is well settled that this type of search constitutes one
of the carefully defined exceptions to the warrant requirement and that such a search
does not violate the fourth amendment. 68 AM. Jut. 2D Searches and Seizures § 37
(1976). See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). However, this search must be limited to
those areas "from which [the suspect] might gain possession of a weapon or destructi-
ble evidence." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
4. When an object is in "plain view," its discovery is not a search for fourth
amendment purposes. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Weaver v. Williams, 509 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Article I, section 5, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution,'
incorporating the protections of the fourth amendment,' guar-
antees citizens a right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. An essential adjunct to this guarantee is found in
the holdings of both the United States and Louisiana Supreme
Courts-warrantless searches, that is, "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable," 7 subject to only a few
exceptions. One of the newer exceptions, the "inventory" of a
vehicle, has been held to be a "search" under the fourth
amendment' and thus must meet its reasonablness require-
ments.' However, with reference to the ultimate validity of
such searches, there has been a split in the opinions of both
state and federal courts. 0 Although presented with earlier op-
5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions
of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure. . . shall have standing to raise
its illegality in the appropriate court.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
6. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Jones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir.
1973).
8. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
9. A warrantless search without probable cause is constitutional under the fourth
amendment and article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution only when it is
"reasonable." State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633 (La. 1976).
10. Cases rejecting the reasonableness of the inventory search include: United
States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); Williams v. United States, 412 F.2d
729 (5th Cir. 1969); Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969); Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84 (1971) Cases upholding
inventory searches as reasonable include: United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Smith, 340 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1972); People v.
Trusty, 183 Colo. 291, 516 P.2d 423 (1973).
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portunities to rule on this issue," the United States Supreme
Court did not do so until 1976 in South Dakota v. Opperman. 12
In Opperman defendant's unoccupied vehicle was im-
pounded after having been parked in a restricted zone over-
night. Pursuant to standard police procedures, the police in-
ventoried the entire car, including the glove compartment
where marijuana was found. When he was subsequently tried
for possession of marijuana, the defendant claimed that the
introduction of evidence obtained from the inventory was un-
constitutional and that the evidence should have been sup-
pressed as the fruit of an illegal search. The trial court disa-
greed and admitted the evidence. Defendant appealed to the
South Dakota Supreme Court,'3 which reversed, holding that
the warrantless inventory of the vehicle's glove compartment
was unreasonable under the circumstances and violated the
fourth amendment." This decision was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court which held that "in following standard
police procedures, prevailing throughout the country and ap-
proved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of
the police was not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amend-
ment." 5
Noting first the lesser expectation of privacy'" and the in-
herent mobility of motor vehicles," the Court justified the
11. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967).
12. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
13. 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975).
14. Id. at 158-59.
15. 428 U.S. at 376.
16. Id. at 368. But see Justice Tate's concurrence in State v. Navarro, 312 So.
2d 848 (La. 1975): "An American's vehicle ... is an important component of his daily
life in the mobile America of this day. A traffic offense does not end, for an American
driver, the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the freedom of his effects from
state rummaging by warrantless search." Id. at 855. Thus, it seems that the Louisiana
Supreme Court does not agree entirely that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in
an automobile.
17. 428 U.S. at 367. One should note that the court is using the traditional
automobile exception to justify the inventory search. The automobile exception was
formed solely to allow police to search vehicles when there was probable cause but
circumstances made it impractical to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maro-
ney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). However,
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search as being necessary to protect the owner's property while
in police custody, to protect police from tort claims for loss of
such property, and to protect police from potential danger."
Due to these considerations, the court held that the search was
not unreasonable and consequently not unconstitutional under
the fourth amendment."1
Although this type of vehicle search had been mentioned
in Louisiana decisions as early as 1964,20 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court did not rule on the constitutional validity of such
searches until 1976 in State v. Jewell. 2 In Jewell police officers
found the defendant asleep in the driver's seat of his automo-
bile, which was illegally parked on the highway with the motor
running and the lights out. Defendant was then removed from
the vehicle and arrested. A police officer immediately invento-
ried the car and found a small pill bottle containing a phency-
clidine (PCP). The PCP was introduced into evidence at defen-
dant's subsequent trial for possession of illegal drugs. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the search did not qualify
as a true inventory search and was therefore unconstitutional.
since by definition an inventory does not involve a probable cause search, reliance on
the automobile exception seems inappropriate.
18. 428 U.S. at 369. These proposed justifications have been widely criticized as
unsound. The "potential danger to police" justification is the weakest. Police arresting
a minor traffic offender have no reason to believe that he or his automobile is danger-
ous. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969). See also
Note, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197 (1972). The other two justifications, i.e., safeguard-
ing the owner's property and protecting police from false tort claims, have somewhat
more substance than the first. However, it seems unfair that possible loss of insurable
property can justify an invasion of privacy, a constitutional right that is uninsurable.
The duty of care owed by police should not be so great as to authorize the search. At
most, the police as depositaries of impounded vehicles are bailees for mutual benefit.
The duty owed the bailor is that of ordinary care. See, e.g., Federal Insurance Co. v.
C&W Transfer and Storage Co., Inc., 282 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). A search
is not inherently part of this ordinary care since locking the car would give it the same
protection that it would get in the owner's garage. See also Opperman v. South Dakota,
428 U.S. 364 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lisko, Inventory Searches of Motor
Vehicles: The Effect of South Dakota v. Opperman, 6 CAPITAL U.L REV. 315; Note, 87
HARV. L. REV. 835 (1974).
19. 428 U.S. at 376.
20. State v. Rowan, 163 So. 2d 87 (La. 1964).
21. 338 So. 2d 633 (La. 1976). The inventory issue was before the Louisiana
Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 315 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975), but that case was decided
on other grounds.
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From the facts, of the case, the court concluded that the pur-
pose of the search was not limited to safeguarding property
within the impounded vehicle for which police might be held
responsible.
2
In so holding, the court adopted the generally accepted
view that essential to a valid inventory search is the presence
of good faith on the part of the police and the absence of a
police motive to circumvent the warrant requirement by calling
a search for evidence an inventory. = To insure the presence of
good faith, the Louisiana court stressed that the search must
be customary and authorized by standard police procedures. 
2
As additional evidence of good faith, the Jewell court men-
tioned that the police might' consult with the automobile cus-
todian concerning the impoundment and inventory.2 However,
the court did not elaborate on this and gave little indication of
when the absence of such a consultation would make an other-
wise true inventory search invalid.
State v. Gautl required the court to confront and resolve
the consultation issue. After arresting the defendant for driving
while intoxicated, the police had inventoried his vehicle de-
spite his protest. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that such
a search is valid only when the vehicle is "necessarily and
lawfully impounded [and the] inventory is necessary under
the exigencies of the situation. "" The application of this new
and stricter test dictates that the customary nature of the im-
poundment or search will no longer suffice to justify this excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. It is clear that both the im-
poundment and the subsequent search must be based on an
22. 338 So. 2d at 639. The court also considered whether the inventory was
limited in scope to those areas where such property might reasonably be found, but it
did not base its holding on that issue. Id. at 639.
23. Id. at 638. The court quoted from Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 544 (1973): "An
essential requirement to a valid inventory search is that the police must have acted in
good faith in conducting the inventory, and must not have used the inventory proce-
dure as a subterfuge for a warrantless search."
24. Id. at 636-37. This follows the reasoning of State v. Breaux, 329 So. 2d 696
(La. 1976), that discriminatory and noncustomary searches are not reasonable.
25. 338 So. 2d at 639.
26. 357 So. 2d 513 (La. 1978).
27. Id. at 516.
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actual necessity. The court emphasized that one factor to con-
sider in determining the existence of such necessity is police
consultation with the car's custodian.2 9 Since the search is
"ostensibly to protect the occupant of the vehicle against loss
of his property or the law enforcement agency against the occu-
pant's claim for failure to guard against such loss, ' ' 21 it would
be consistent with this justification to give the custodian an
opportunity to make other arrangements for the car or even
"consent to the agency's failure to afford him such protec-
tion. '"0 In Gaut the police, without any valid justification, pro-
hibited the defendant's guest passenger from driving the car
away as the defendant had requested.3' Since there was an
unobjectionable alternative to the inventory, which would have
relieved the police of any duty owed to the defendant, it was
not necessary to impound or search the vehicle. Thus the
search was held to be outside the scope of a "true inventory
search." The court in no way qualified this consultation re-
quirement, thus implying that the custodian should always be
able to vitiate the need for a search, even when there is no guest
passenger or any other alternative to the impoundment.3 2 Since
the need to impound does not presuppose the need to search,
a separate need must be found before police can conduct an
inventory search. In effect, the court has imposed a two-stage
test by which to determine the constitutional validity of an
inventory: (1) was it necessary to impound? and (2) was it
necessary to search?
Although neither Jewell nor Gaut outlines the requisites of
a "true inventory search," both decisions recognize the possi-




31. Id. at 515.
32. The justification for the inventory search of the vehicle is ostensibly
to protect the occupant of the vehicle against loss of his property or the law
enforcement agency against the occupant's claim for failure to guard against
such loss. This justification has a very hollow basis indeed, if the occupant
disclaims that any valuables are involved and is willing to consent to the
agency's failure to afford him such protection by an inventory search.
357 So. 2d at 516.
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Constitution. These decisions indicate that in today's mobile
society the police, as a practical matter, should be able to make
the restricted invasions of privacy that are entailed in inven-
tory searches,s but only when the searches are necessary and
only when they are "restricted to their limited purpose." 3' Re-
fusing to accord blanket acceptance to the inventory search,
which could provide an all too available means for police to
circumvent the warrant requirement, the court has chosen to
determine the reasonableness of the search by looking to the
facts of each individual case.
The various Louisiana inventory search cases have focused
on the particular facts surrounding a search in determining its
reasonableness .3  Such facts include: whether the police re-
quested consent of the custodian before searching;36 whether
the police allowed the custodian of the car to make other ar-
rangements for his vehicle; 7 whether standard inventory forms
were completed;38 whether the police searched the vehicle after
the tow truck was called;3 whether the police searched the car
on the scene or at the place of storage;'0 whether the police
asked the custodian if the vehicle held any valuables that
would make the inventory necessary;" and whether the search
33. "[I]n the crowded and mobile society of today, the practical exigencies of
law-enforcement have sometimes been held to justify limited invasion of privacy...
even though based on something less than probable cause . 357 So. 2d at 516.
34. Id. at 516.
35. In the very recent case of State v. LaRue, No. 62,394 (La. Sup. Ct. March 5,
1979), Justice Calogero listed the factors which the Louisiana Supreme Court has
found to be significant in determining the reasonableness of an inventory search.
36. State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133 (La. 1978); State v. Rome, 354 So. 2d 504
(La. 1978).
37. State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133 (La. 1978); State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d 513
(La. 1978); State v. Rome, 354 So. 2d 504 (La. 1978); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633
(La. 1978). It should be noted that none of these opinions give any indication of how
much effort police should put forth to contact the car custodian if he is not on the
scene. It seems that they should make some reasonable effort since other arrangements
by the custodian would absolve the police of all liability and obviate the need to search
the car.
38. State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633 (La. 1978).
39. State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133 (La. 1978); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633
(La. 1976).
40. State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133 (La. 1978); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633
(La. 1976).
41. State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d 513 (La. 1978); State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133
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was limited in scope to those places where valuables might
reasonably be kept."2 In examining these factors, the court has
attempted to determine the true reason for the search. If the
court infers from the circumstances that the purpose of the
police was to obtain evidence, the search is not a "true inven-
tory search" and is therefore unconstitutional. Since the intru-
sion is without probable cause or a warrant, all of the facts
surrounding the search must indicate its reasonableness. If any
aspect of the search makes it appear that the police were
searching for evidence and not merely taking an inventory, the
search will not be reasonable.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the need for
the police to make this type of search at times,' 3 but to avoid
police abuse, it has refrained from recognizing an absolute right
to make an inventory. As the court said in Jewell,
"Fundamental constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches cannot be evaded by labelling them 'inventory'
searches."' Accordingly, Gaut requires a showing of an actual
need to legitimate each individual search. Evidently the court
does not believe that this additional proof of reasonableness,
which goes beyond Opperman's required proof of a standard
good faith search, will adversely affect police activity in this
regard.
The United States Supreme Court's application of a differ-
ent standard of reasonableness is evident from an examination
of Opperman. There, the Court held that an inventory search
is reasonable because of the lesser expectation of privacy," the
inherent mobility of an automobile,' and the three "distinct
needs" for the search that were discussed earlier.'7 Although
(La. 1978). The Gaut court implied that the custodian can always vitiate the need for
the inventory search by stating there are no valuables in the car and waiving the
inventory protection.
42. State v. Rome, 354 So. 2d 504 (La. 1978); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633 (La.
1978).
43. See note 33, supra.
44. 338 So. 2d 633, 637 (La. 1976).
45. 428 U.S. 364, 368. It should be noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court has
never accepted this lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile. See note 16, supra.
46. Id. at 367.
47. Id. at 369. See note 18, supra, and accompanying text.
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the opinion says that the facts of each case must determine the
reasonableness of the search, the arguments that justify search-
ing seem to make inventories reasonable per se since the bases
for a finding of reasonableness will be present in any situation.
The only restriction seems to be that the circumstances sur-
rounding the search must not make it appear to be an obvious
police ploy to circumvent the warrant requirement.'
The United States Supreme Court evidently wants to put
as few restraints as possible on this supposedly legitimate po-
lice function' and accordingly has deemed standard, good faith
inventory searches reasonable. In so doing, the Court has al-
lowed the policy authorizing the search to outweigh all factual
considerations. The result is an overly broad view of reasona-
bleness" that is much less strict than the Louisiana standard
which requires a factual finding of both the need to impound
and the need to search.5
The need to inventory justifies the resulting invasion of
privacy in much the same way as probable cause justifies a
search for evidence. 52 The underlying basis of both is that the
intrusion is necessary because of special circumstances. How-
48. Id. at 377. "[Tlhere is no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure,
essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an
investigatory police motive." Id. at 376.
49. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), where the United
States Supreme Court recognized the need for considering police functions while inter-
preting the fourth amendment.
50. If the search were prompted by some actual need, as in Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433 (1973), the search would seem to be reasonable. In Cady the search was
prompted by a reasonable belief that the automobile contained a revolver because the
car owner was a Chicago policeman who was required to carry a weapon at all times.
51. The need to impound can easily exist when there is no need to inventory; as
a practical matter, police cannot leave automobiles on the street unattended. However,
when there is no distinct need to search, the inventory will not be reasonable even
though the impoundment is.
52. "Generally, 'probable cause' exists where the facts and circumstances within
police officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed." 68 Am. Ju .2D Searches and Seizures § 42
(1976). In other words, there is probable cause when the officer is reasonable in believ-
ing that the search or seizure is necessary. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). In Louisiana an inventory is reasonable when the circumstances are such that
the search is necessary. State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d 513 (La. 1978).
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ever, in searching for evidence, probable cause alone does not
justify the search; there must be a warrant or some special
exception for such a search to be constitutionally supportable. 3
The warrant requirement allows for an objective determination
of whether probable cause actually exists. This determination
is made before the search so as to protect as many citizens as
possible from unreasonable invasions of privacy.
At present, the Louisiana Supreme Court has been dealing
with an inventory search by examining all of the surrounding
circumstances, after the search, to determine whether it was
reasonable-whether the need to inventory did in fact exist.
However, the only remedy available for illegal inventory search
under this post-search scrutiny is the exclusion of the evi-
dence.' The right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures encompasses all citizens and should protect all;5 by
allowing a magistrate to decide, prior to the search, whether
there is sufficient need to make an inventory reasonable, the
right to be free from unreasonable searches would be insured.
Thus, it would be consistent with the theory of protecting
against unreasonable searches to require a warrant for an in-
ventory search."
53. See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), held that the fourth amendment applied
to state actions and, accordingly, that evidence secured by "unreasonable searches and
seizures" could not be used against the victim of the search in a criminal proceeding
in state court. This incorporated the federal "exclusionary rule" of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
55. See, e.g., State v. Breaux, 329 So. 2d 696, 699 (La. 1976), in which the court
stated: "A Louisiana motorist does not, by entering his vehicle, lose at the whim of a
traffic policeman his constitution's protection of his person against unreasonable
searches." A pari, a citizen does not, by committing a minor traffic offense, lose the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches of his effects.
56. In Louisiana the inventory is justified by saying that the search is to protect
the car owner from loss of property and to protect the police from tort claims resulting
from such loss. State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d 513, 516 (La. 1978). These being the reasons
to search, there seems to be nothing requiring an immediate search. The short time
that it would take to obtain a warrant would not prevent the inventory from serving
this narrow purpose. The United States Supreme Court has noted the added justifica-
tion of protecting the police from potential harm. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 369 (1976). Perhaps the short delay incurred by a warrant requirement would
adversely affect this purpose, but the Louisiana court does not recognize this as a valid
justification. Accordingly, Louisiana has even more reason to require a warrant. One
should also note the view of three Louisiana Supreme Court Justices on when a warrant
An inventory search of a legally impounded vehicle can be
a reasonable invasion of privacy under both the Louisiana and
United States Constitution. However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has required much more proof of this reasonableness
than the United States Supreme Court. Seemingly, the Louis-
iana court believes that the need to search may exist under
some circumstances, while the United States Supreme Court
feels that there is always such a need. At any rate, both views
of reasonableness might well be improved by letting a magis-
trate, rather than the police, decide what is a "true inventory
search."
Richard W. Beard
THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT-Is THERE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS?
Petitioner, sheriff of Alameda County, refused respondent
broadcasting company permission to inspect and photograph
areas of a county jail in which a prisoner's suicide had allegedly
occurred. Petitioner's policy was to exclude access to both the
press and the public. Respondent brought an action alleging
that exclusion was a deprivation of its first and fourteenth
amendment rights. The district court preliminarily enjoined
petitioner from preventing respondents reasonable access to
the jail. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "[tihere is no discernable basis for a constitutional duty
[on government] to disclose, or for standards governing disclo-
should be required to authorize searching an impounded vehicle for evidence. In State
v. Lain, 347 So. 2d 167, 171 n.1 (La. 1977), Justice Dixon wrote: "The author is of the
personal view that exigent circumstances do not exist when the automobile is lawfully
(R.S. 40:989) in custody of police at the station. If there is an opportunity to obtain a
search warrant, the circumstances are not exigent, and we should require that a war-
rant be obtained. Nevertheless, that is not the state of the law." Also, in State v.
Williams, 347 So. 2d 231, 235 n.2 (La. 1977), Justice Calogero remarked: "Although
this author personally believes, along with two of the other Justices of this Court, that
when an automobile has been taken into police custody at a stationhouse that a
search should never be authorized without a warrant even though 'exigent circum-
stances' had existed earlier at the scene, the state of the law is otherwise."
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